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Is Native Title Law Destroying Native Title? 
Today I’m going to share with you some of my observations of the native title process 
over the past couple of years, during which time I practised as a lawyer in a native title 
representative body.  I share these reflections to encourage a critical perspective on native 
title processes and on the practice of law.  In particular, I seek to show through this 
critical perspective that rather than recognising and protecting native title, native title law 
is in fact destroying native title.  I will argue that it takes this critical perspective to 
understand the impact our dominant system has on traditional rights and interests. 
In my address today, I will examine the role of the law, the role of the lawyer, the role of 
the anthropologist and the role of the parties in the native title claim process.  I will 
suggest that all of these players collude within this system to deconstruct traditional 
culture, thereby possibly turning it into something else.  It is on this basis that I suggest 
that the native title processes perform an almost assimilationist role and that all parties to 
these processes are complicit in this.  The process of assimilation denies the identity of 
traditional rights and interests as being of their own unique system, and claims them as 
part of the dominant paradigm. 
I will be using the term ‘assimilation’ to imply that a subordinate group comes to ‘accept 
and internalise values and culture of the dominant group’.  In contrast I will use 
‘multiculturalism’ to imply allowing a group ‘to live along side [a dominant group] while 
adhering to its own values’.1  While traditional owners themselves may not feel that they 
have internalised the values of the dominant group, today I will explore the idea that to 
prove culture, to prove identity, to prove connection according to the norms of the 
dominant system, is effectively to submit to that system and become of that system – if 
not least in the eyes of the dominant system itself.  Once the dominant system categorises 
traditional law as ‘native title’ in accordance with its norms, the traditional body of laws 
becomes ‘native title’ and is a creature of common law.  Traditional law exists no longer 
on its own terms: it has been destroyed.  
                                                
1 John Scott & Gordon Marshall (eds) A Dictionary of Sociology (3rd ed, 2005) 24. 
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The Common Law 
Pre-Mabo,2 the Australian courts could not conceive of an indigenous claim to land as a 
property right.  An oft-stated example of this is Milirrpum v Nabalco: 
I think this problem has to be solved by considering the substance of proprietary interests rather 
than their outward indicia.  I think that property, in its many forms, generally implies the right to 
use or enjoy, the right to exclude others, and the right to alienate.  I do not say that all these rights 
must co-exist before there can be a proprietary interest or deny that each of them may be subject to 
qualifications. … [B]y this standard, I do not think that I can characterise the relationship of the 
clan to the land as proprietary.3 
It was within the framework of property that the common law sought to understand the 
nature of the relationship between people and land.  In spite of parallels within the feudal 
tenurial system where services were expected of those who held an interest in land, the 
experience of the dominant legal culture failed to recognize in customary law any parallel 
with its own norms.  And underlying this are the unasked questions: why did indigenous 
claims need to be categorized as a property right; and why should the colonial courts 
need to find parallels in common law. 
In Mabo however, the court was ready to recognize customary law reflecting the 
relationship between people and land, and found a way to admit it into the common law 
without disturbing Australia’s claim to sovereignty. 
The case put by the Meriam people in Mabo, using the common law, was a subversion of 
the legal conceptual framework hitherto applied in Australia in favour of the settlers.  
Mabo sought to achieve an outcome achieved for traditional owners elsewhere in the 
world – using the dominant system to further their own ends.  There was no suggestion 
that in using the common law the applicants actually came to ‘accept and internalise the 
values and culture of the dominant group’4  ie the action brought by the Meriam people 
was not an act of assimilation, but arguably represented more a desire to live alongside 
the dominant culture while adhering to their own values (which could be described as a 
                                                
2 Mabo v The State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
3 (1971) 17 FLR 141, 268-73, Blackburn J. 
4 John Scott & Gordon Marshall Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (3rd ed, 2005) 24. 
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multicultural approach).  In legal argument, they did not seek to challenge the 
sovereignty of the dominant group, but sought to stand alongside the dominant culture 
within its broad framework.  Importantly also, the court did not seek to absorb the 
traditional law and custom of the Meriam people: it did not destroy their native title but 
recognised it as a separate system.  As a result of their action, the Meriam people became 
a people whose own laws were recognized by common law.   
(It should be noted that a precondition for success was not to challenge sovereignty, 
which the High Court found was not justiciable.  This does represent working within the 
dominant framework, but does not necessarily represent acceptance or internalisation of 
it.) 
What the common law did recognise seems to have been a unique set of rights derived 
from customary or traditional law.  The nature of native title as sui generis has been 
accepted by the Australian courts – for example:  
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by and 
the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory.  The nature and 
incidents of native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to those laws and 
customs.5 
Native title has its origin in the traditional laws acknowledged and the customs observed by the 
indigenous people who possess the native title.  6 
Mabo [No 2] was a brave judicial attempt to redress the wrongs of dispossession. But its 
"recognition" of native title has involved the courts in categorising and charting the bounds of 
something that, being sui generis, really has no parallel in the common law.7 
Richard Bartlett has argued that where the courts identify native title as having this 
unique nature (ie in term of the dominant paradigm) they impose a barrier to according 
native title ‘full respect’ under the law.8  This means that if native title is regarded as sui 
generis, the law can impose on traditional owners the burden of proving that the title 
                                                
5 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 [64] per Brennan J. 
6 Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96 at [46] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Hayne & Callinan JJ citing Brennan J with approval. 
7 Western Australia v Ward (2002) 191 ALR 1, [969] per Callinan J. 
8 Richard Bartlett Native Title in Australia (2nd ed, 2004) 102. 
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exists.  The recent case of Risk v Northern Territory of Australia9 illustrates the types of 
burden Bartlett talks about. 
• First, traditional owners must particularise traditional laws and customs.  In Risk, 
the judgment provides significant detail as to particular traditional laws and 
customs.  It draws on historical documentary evidence, and on oral testimony of 
the applicants.  There is a list of traditional laws and customs including cultural 
organisation and practices, economy and resource use, spirituality etc.  The 
judgment, as is the way in our legal system, outlines the case for and against the 
existence of many of these traditional laws and customs.  It is usual to see such 
detail in native title cases.  One problem with this approach is the onus it places 
on applicants such as those in Risk, where indigenous people’s lives and the 
practice of their customs have been disrupted as a consequence of European 
settlement.  Another problem for applicants is that it is questionable the extent to 
which the laws of a traditional society can be particularised in terms the common 
law can understand.  The problems with this are illustrated in the evidence given 
in the Kumarangk (Hindmarsh Island) Royal Commission, as outlined by 
Strelein10 where counsel assisting the commission said to George Trevorrow, 
giving evidence, ‘I want to put a label on it so that we can understand it.’  
Ultimately the witness responded, ‘It is plain to see you would never understand 
about that anyway.’ 
• Secondly, courts may refuse to recognise that a society must necessarily have 
maintained traditional laws and customs:  if a group is a society, then it must have 
some system by which it achieves that cohesion.  In Risk Mansfield J accepted 
‘The Larrakia community of today is a vibrant, dynamic society which embraces 
its history and traditions.  This group has shown its strength as a community…’ 
and ‘that there is, and has been, a continuous recognition in the Darwin area of 
certain persons as Larrakia, both by self-identification and by community 
                                                
9 [2006] FCA 404 (unreported, Mansfield J, 13 April 2006). 
10 Lisa Strelein ‘The “Courts of the Conqueror”: The Judicial System and The Assertion of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights’ [2000] Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 22  
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recognition.’11  The judge refers to the ‘Larrakia people’ throughout the judgment, 
although ultimately distinguishes this from the ‘current’ Larrakia society.  In spite 
of acknowledging the applicants’ identity as a people, the judge found 
nevertheless that there was no maintenance of traditional laws and customs.  It is 
not clear then by what standard the applicant group was distinguishable as the 
‘Larrakia people’.  Because the society was viewed through the dominant 
paradigm, it was denied existence: it seems to exist, but is not recognised.  It is 
destroyed. 
• Thirdly, the courts require proof of continued acknowledgement and observance 
of traditional laws and customs.  Again, Mansfield J in Risk said that his ‘focus 
[had] been upon whether the current Larrakia society has the traditional laws and 
customs of the society which existed at sovereignty.’  Mansfield J found  
‘significant changes in those laws and customs from those which existed at sovereignty… 
[which were] not simply an adaptation or evolution of the traditional laws and customs of 
the Larrakia people in response to economic, environmental and historical and other 
changes’.  12 
While there was evidence in Risk of the applicants following traditional law or 
custom, the court found that there were inconsistencies in evidence as to what the 
law was, and in particular that there was not a traditional mode of oral 
transmission from elders.  The Larrakia people had relied on external sources to 
learn about their laws and customs, and this was not (according to the court) a 
traditional means of dissemination.  Mansfield therefore did ‘not find that their 
current laws and customs are ‘traditional’ in the sense required by s 223(1) and as 
explained by the High Court in Yorta Yorta.’13  This is in spite of the judge 
stipulating that the applicants had to show that ‘the present day body of accepted 
laws and customs in essence is the same body of laws and customs acknowledged 
and observed by the ancestors of members of the Larrakia people adapted to 
                                                
11 Risk v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 404 (unreported, Mansfield J, 13 April 2006), [825]. 
12 ibid, [837]. 
13 ibid, [834]. 
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modern circumstances.14 (emphasis added).  He then added a further requirement, 
of showing that the ‘system of rules…has had a continued existence and vitality 
since sovereignty’.15 
The current vitality of the applicants’ culture was defeated in spite of its essential 
nature being retained and adapted as there was apparently no continued existence.  
Again this begs the question of how a continuous society can have a vital culture 
now, in the face of oppression and dispossession, if there has not been in essence 
a continuation of that culture. 
• Fourthly, the law has rejected the concept that abandonment (of the traditional 
laws and customs) must be voluntary.  This leaves applicants like those in Risk 
unable to defend the apparent discontinuous practise of the laws and customs 
enumerated, on the basis that it wasn’t their choice.  It also means that applicants 
like the Larrakia people are left unable to resuscitate elements of their culture 
through adaptive, external means (such as receiving knowledge of culture from 
people outside the clan) as this apparently is not a traditional mode of learning. 
These burdens reinforce the identity of this title as the ‘other’ in our system: it ‘is neither 
an institution of the common law nor a form of common law tenure but it is recognised 
by the common law’.16  As the ‘other’, falling outside the dominant paradigm, the 
dominant system in its new (post-Mabo) consciousness will recognise native title, but 
fails to give it form.  In highlighting its unique and special nature, the courts have not 
given native title substance within their dominant system.  In that respect, the system is 
destroying native title itself. 
This prompts the question of whether it is the role of the common law to give native title 
substance, or whether it is simply its role to receive it as it is – or if you like, in common 
law terms laid down in Mabo, as a burden on the Crown’s radical title.  Native title after 
all represents ‘the antecedent rights and interests in land possessed by the Indigenous 
                                                
14 ibid, [8]. 
15 ibid, [10]. 
16 Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96 at [46] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ. 
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inhabitants of the territory [which] survived the change in sovereignty’17 – ie it was here 
first, and it is the job of the common law to fit in with what previously existed.  This is 
supported by the judgement of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ, in 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr where they said:  
Because native title has its origin in traditional laws and customs, and is neither an institution of 
the common law nor a form of common law tenure, it is necessary to curb the tendency (perhaps 
inevitable and natural) to conduct an inquiry about the existence of native title rights and interests 
in the language of the common law property lawyer.18 
However in the following year in Western Australia v Ward, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ described the task as ‘identifying how rights and interests 
possessed under traditional law and custom can properly find expression in common law 
terms’. 19 
If the dominant law could allow native title substance, native title may enter the common 
law property rights discourse.  This would however require a full description of native 
title within the framework of common law property rights.  Janice Gray argues that ‘the 
task of recognition is made easier if the unknown is equated with the known’.20  However 
she also points out that ‘we will need to explore more creative means for giving 
expression to Indigenous customs and traditions if they are unfamiliar to the common 
law’.21 
The comments in Western Australia v Ward could be seen through a bigger lens as 
suggested by Gray: that ‘properly finding expression’ implies something more creative 
than a mere translation which would involve these rights losing their identity (ie being 
destroyed).  Such an approach could represent the difference between assimilation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture, and a multicultural solution.   
                                                
17 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 57 per Brennan J at 82-3, cited in Bartlett see above n1. 
18 [2001] HCA 56 (Unreported, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ 
11 October 2001), [11]. 
19 [2002] HCA 28 (Unreported, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ 
31 October 2002), [89]. 
20 Janice Gray ‘Is Native Title a Proprietary Right?’ (2002) vol 9, No3 Murdoch University Electronic 
Journal of Law [7]. 
21 Ibid, [14]. 
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These concepts could perhaps be advanced if it were not for the Native Title Act, which 
directly intervenes in the common law processes to interpose its own administrative 
process into native title. 
The Native Title Act 
The enactment of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘NTA’) and its subsequent 
interpretation by the courts changed the position of traditional owners from their Mabo 
foundation.  The Act seeks to ‘recognise and protect native title’.22  It purports to work 
for the benefit of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders – indeed the preamble 
recites that the Act is a special measure for the ‘adequate advancement and protection of 
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders’ in terms of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination.   
However this aim fails to identify how advancement will be achieved: how the ‘just and 
proper ascertainment of native title rights and interests’ cited in the preamble will 
advance Indigenous Australians.  One analysis may assume that this is through the 
integration of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders into the dominant culture.  
This is affirmed by the Act’s charter to ‘recognise and protect’ native title – the dominant 
culture being the protector.   
A traditional owner however may see advancement as the right to exercise their 
traditional laws and customs to the fullest extent, free from interference by the dominant 
culture.   
What is the reality?  I argue that the application of common law processes in the courts 
and government policy view ‘advancement’ within the dominant paradigm, which creates 
a point of difference for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.  From this 
perspective, the Act captures and regulates the process by which advancement was 
apparently achieved under common law by the Meriam people in Mabo.  It wrests control 
of the common law process undertaken in Mabo and submits it to the requirements of the 
statute even though it is anticipated (and indeed required) that the court 
                                                
22 s10. 
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moderate/determine every claim.  This process transforms traditional law and custom 
into common law recognised rights. 
Rather than traditional owners using the dominant system to advance their customary law 
position which I argue reflects a multicultural perspective, the Act now brings the 
customary law system within the hybrid administrative and judicial processes of the 
Native Title Act in such a way as to assimilate traditional law and culture.  The impact of 
the way the Act is used has been seen in our discussion of the Risk case – in particular in 
the burden of proof borne by claimants to particularise their traditional law and custom 
and to show that they have continuously observed it since sovereignty. 
Callinan J in Ward acknowledges the challenges posed by the Act:   
‘Parliament has been compelled to intervene, repeatedly, to secure the validity of acts that were 
never before thought to be problematic.  And we now have a body of law that is so complicated, 
shifting and abstruse that it continues to require the intervention of this Court to resolve even the 
most basic issues, such as the effect of freehold or leases on native title.  Judging from the 
submissions to this Court and the native title legislation that we have had to consider, few people, 
if any, have been able to thread this labyrinth of Minos unscathed.’ 23 (footnotes omitted) 
Rather than address the direct legal aspects of the Act in any further detail, I will look at 
the application of government policy through funding of native title issues under the Act. 
The Funding Aspects of the Native Title Act 
The Commonwealth actively controls the native title process through funding: not 
applicants directly, but via native title representative bodies (‘NTRBs’) as well as funding 
respondents, National Native Title Tribunal and courts.  It also passively controls the 
process through the knowledge that state governments will fight claims via the 
adversarial court system.   
In addition, the Commonwealth exercises passive control via requirements for 
accountability of NTRB’s to the Commonwealth for the funding.  Funding is tied up with 
‘outcomes’ determined by the Commonwealth.  These are not the outcomes of ‘adequate 
                                                
23 Ward v Western Australia (2002) 191 ALR 1, [969]. 
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advancement and protection of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders’ or ‘full 
recognition and status within the Australian nation to which their prior rights and 
interests…entitle them to aspire’ recited in the Act’s preamble.  Rather these are 
outcomes in terms of those NTRB functions enumerated in s203B NTA and the terms of 
the NTRB funding agreement.   
The definition of the outcomes by which accountability is measured confirms the analysis 
that the dominant paradigm determines what is ‘adequate advancement and protection of 
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders’.  The relevant Commonwealth department 
would surely report that the Act was achieving its objectives if its own threshold were 
met.  Whether the people for whose benefit the Act is in force would agree is not part of 
the assessment process.  Indeed the formal reporting requirements and audit processes 
imposed on NTRB’s by the funding bodies leave little if any scope for reporting outside 
the funder-determined outcomes.  The perspective of Indigenous people is omitted 
altogether from the funding framework.  
This funding process, instigated by the NTA, fails to ‘recognise and protect’ native title.  
It fails to take into account traditional law and custom and it dictates the method of 
operation of organisations charged with facilitating the native title process for applicants.  
It views the native title process, native title law, through a dominant paradigm 
unconnected to the traditional rights and interests.  To this extent, the funding process 
itself contributes to the dismantling of native title as traditional law, and promotes the 
dominant understanding of what is native title. 
Joinder of parties 
As mentioned, the funding framework extends beyond NTRB’s (on behalf of applicants) 
and to respondent parties. 
It seems that the sui generis nature of native title (whose identity as a common law 
proprietary interest is questioned) broadens the base of those who would normally have 
standing to challenge a claim for land: for respondents do not need to show an interest in 
land.  Thus people who would not have standing in a common law claim relating to 
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protection of their real interest, have standing in native title jurisdiction.  Respondent 
parties eligible to be funded under s200 and s183 NTA include: 
• the state, which has sovereignty and which claims full beneficial ownership 
(s200); 
• local authorities whose power is derived from the state and which have no estate 
nor interest in land under their jurisdiction (unless they hold crown land as 
trustees, in which case their interest is on behalf of the crown); 
• miners whose rights are derived from the state which owns all minerals; 
• commercial fishermen whose rights are derived from the state or Commonwealth; 
• pastoralists whose rights are derived from the state ; and 
• trespassers whose claims to crown land would not be entertained at common law. 
In Risk, the respondent parties included: Darwin City Council, Amateur Fishermen’s 
Association of the Northern Territory, Conservation Land Council, Darwin Model Flying 
Club and the Northern Territory Christian Schools Association.   
Except in respect of the states, the Attorney-General’s guidelines for funding require the 
respondent to show it is reasonable that the action be funded.  This includes 
considerations such as: 
• the severity and the extent of the implications of the native title claim for the 
applicant;  
• what will happen if the [applicant] does not have a chance to put forward their 
views;  
• whether the benefit to the applicant is worth the cost of the case;  
Kate Galloway   12 
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• the benefit the general public will gain from obtaining a decision in the matter. 24 
In addition, the guidelines acknowledge that ‘not having legal representation is likely to 
create a detriment (emotional, business management and financial) for individual 
parties’.25  These elements therefore are implicit in every application.  There is no such 
acknowledgement in the NTA preamble, in spite of its reference to justice and 
advancement of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders. 
Nowhere in the guidelines is there any mention of recognition or protection of native 
title.  There is no indication of any burden of proof on the applicant in relation to 
establishing an interest in the land claimed.  The guidelines appear to support 
government-funded obstacles to achieving recognition and protection of a pre-existing 
right.  If we know that native title exists, which was established in Mabo and affirmed in 
the NTA, surely it’s a matter for the state to establish that its unequivocal exercise of 
sovereign power has extinguished native title in any particular case ie that the state 
establish where it has the full beneficial ownership of land.  This would indeed 
‘[advance] and [protect] Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders’ and provide ‘full 
recognition and status within the Australian nation to which their prior rights and 
interests…entitle them to aspire’ as recited in the Act’s preamble.   
The whole tenor of the NTA however places the onus on applicants to prove their prior 
interest, in contest with respondent parties funded by the agency with a responsibility to 
protect that interest.  In not just allowing but in funding the variety of respondents that it 
does, the government (passively) ensures that the recognition process can only occur 
where the respondent parties allow it to do so.  Respondents are usually willing to allow 
this in exchange for concessions from native title holders.  Respondents’ bargaining 
power is strongest before recognition takes place.  This process, of which traditional 
owners are by definition a part, inhibits or defers recognition and protection of native 
title.   
                                                
24 Attorney-General’s Department, Legal Aid Branch, Provision of Financial Assistance by the Attorney-
General in Native Title Cases Guidelines (30 November 1998) < 
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/agdHome.nsf/Page/RWPCF4E5D9BB8F1D8DFCA25705E0082A471> 
at 8 April 2006, clause 6.5. 
25 ibid, clause 6.6. 
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A more beneficial reading of the legislation or even application of the funding processes 
may acknowledge that if the state has granted rights which were subject to other (ie 
customary) rights and interests, then those interest holders will take only what the state 
was able to give.  This is a matter as between the state and other interest holders.  This 
issue is not one for traditional owners to engage in.   
As beneficial legislation, the NTA should be read in favour of native title holders.26  
Indeed in Commonwealth v Yarmirr,27 the court found that: 
In so far as the act provides for protection of native title it can be seen as supplementing the rights 
and interests of native title holders under the common law of Australia and thus in this way at 
least, giving effect to one of the purposes of the Act recorded in its preamble.28 
Note that the Act supplements rights.  This means, it is in addition to existing rights.  This 
is at odds with the scheme of the Act which, as we have seen, seeks to establish that those 
rights exist.  Creating the adversarial environment in which this is established, including 
support for respondent parties where it is a ‘matter of public interest’ that a determination 
of rights (impliedly of the respondent) be made, surely does not supplement these rights 
of native title holders but rather seeks to challenge them.   
The scheme implemented by the NTA creates a forum within which traditional owners are 
required to exercise the state’s standard of proof to satisfy the state and respondent 
parties, and to negotiate away full native title rights simply to have those rights 
recognized and protected by the common law.  The Act itself thus provides a mechanism 
for the rights’ destruction. 
When we look at this legislation through our ethnocentric lens, in spite of what the courts 
have declared in relation to native title, all we can see is the imposition of the unknown, 
the other, onto the known, the familiar of our existing norm of common law derived real 
property rights.  This position is clearly reflected in the scheme of the Act, and in its 
application.   
                                                
26 Pareroultja v Tickner (1993) 42 FCR 32 at 44 per Lockhart J (O’Loughlin and Whitlam JJ in accord). 
27 (2001) 208 CLR 1. 
28 at [7]. 
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Traditional owners and their pre-existing rights remain marginalised unless and until the 
common law can conceive of them within its own framework in accordance with the 
procedures in the NTA.  At this point, the common law takes ownership of those rights as 
their protector. 
The Lawyer 
We have browsed through some of the common law and statutory aspects of native title 
to identify where traditional law and custom is effectively usurped and thus destroyed by 
the dominant paradigm.  We’ll turn now to examine where the lawyer stands in this 
process.  There are three main threads we’ll look at:  the repackaging of traditional owner 
knowledge as evidence; identifying the lawyer’s duty to the traditional owner client; and 
obtaining informed consent. 
Lawyers are after all officers of the court.  Their overarching duty is to the court.  This 
duty supersedes any duty to their client.  Lawyers are part of the legal system, and a 
product of it.  This is where I am interested to explore the dual relationship between 
lawyers and traditional owners, and lawyers and the system – which we have seen is 
skewed apparently against the traditional owner, in spite of the declarations in the case 
law and in the Native Title Act itself.  I argue that by engaging in the native title process, 
in applying the craft of a lawyer, lawyers too are complicit in the deconstruction and 
assimilation of traditional owners’ culture into the dominant culture. 
Repackaging Traditional Owner Knowledge  
In the 1979 film Kramer vs Kramer,29 the Dustin Hoffman character admitted to his 
estranged wife that he had felt responsible for their son’s accident in a playground.  Both 
parents came together when the son was being treated for his injuries, and engaged in a 
tender exchange.  Later in the courtroom custody battle, the father was cross examined by 
the mother’s counsel about the playground incident.  “Didn’t you admit to feeling 
responsible when your son was injured?”  This evidence was adduced to indicate that the 
father was not suitable to take custody of the child.  The Meryl Streep character looked 
                                                
29 Directed by Robert Benton, Columbia Pictures Corporation, 1979. 
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crestfallen: she had obviously disclosed the incident to her lawyer without realizing the 
potential for it to be used against the father. 
This scenario illustrates how lawyers use evidence.  It shows that to a lawyer, your story, 
your identity, your feelings, are all available to support your case in court.  It shows that 
once this enters the public domain, it changes the nature and character of the story or 
identity or feeling.  It also shows how a client can lose control, lose ownership of their 
story. 
I feel this is a useful analogy for native title.  Lawyers are trained to collect evidence, 
select the best and present it in support of their client’s case.  For a traditional owner 
client, identity and culture provide the evidence for a native title claim and in giving that 
evidence over, it changes things as it did in Kramer vs Kramer.   
Lawyers therefore have an entirely different concept of traditional culture.  To a lawyer, 
regardless of their respect for or commitment to traditional owners’ struggle to get their 
land back, the stories, activities and culture of traditional owners constitute evidence in 
an adversarial trial.  These activities and stories will be evidence in support of the claim, 
or they will be evidence against the claim.  For the NTRB lawyer, in the latter case this 
‘evidence’ must be explained either in terms which bring it within the framework 
supporting the claim, or at least as not destroying the integrity of the claim (ie when the 
state or another respondent party raises this issue, how can we answer their claims?).   
Crown representatives too should use information about activities and stories judiciously 
in their interactions with traditional owners.  Comments to traditional owners in 
mediation, such as ‘you don’t even have a language any more’ to imply that connection is 
weak are disrespectful at best, and at worst reveal the attitude of the dominant paradigm 
(the state) towards the traditional owner.  Such a view is incorrect at law, but as a guiding 
philosophy represents the passive dismantling of traditional culture by the native title 
lawyer. 
I am of the view that lawyers need to recognise the way they handle information and 
knowledge in the native title context, and take care in how they use it.  Gaining 
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information about how a person or a group of people behave from time to time, can be 
intrusive and handled insensitively can disempower the person.  This flies in the face of 
the goal in the preamble of the NTA. 
Lawyers’ Duty to the Traditional Owner Client 
We can envisage an inherent clash of culture with the NTRB lawyer in the same terms as 
that between traditional and common law itself, where the lawyer naturally translates 
native title into common law concepts.  This is necessary to oppose respondents’ claims 
and answer their criticisms, as much as to find a concrete and substantial interest in 
common law terms, to maximise the benefit to their clients.  The lawyer thinks: if I can 
find some kind of right to exclusive use and occupation of land, this is the biggest kind of 
right known to the common law, and we can secure a better and more extensive form of 
title for the traditional owners. 
As discussed, this can deny a traditional owner their own conceptions of their native title 
rights and interests, and risks a ranking of native title rights and interests according to 
common law perceptions of proprietary interests.  It has the related impact in relation to 
prioritisation of claims, again according to the funding framework.  If a right can be 
characterised as one of a fuller extent (eg right to exclusive use and occupation) then that 
right will be pursued in preference perhaps to one which is characterised as a lesser right 
(eg right to pass over land seasonally).  This does not necessarily reflect the priorities of 
traditional owners themselves.   
This highlights why the legal profession in native title law must allow traditional owners 
to retain ownership and expression of their own laws and customs.  To highlight the 
lawyer’s duty to their client we must also consider the beneficial nature of the NTA and 
indeed of the premise on which Brennan J’s judgment rested in Mabo:  
…no case can command unquestioning adherence if the rule it expresses seriously offends the 
values of justice and human rights (especially equality before the law) which are aspirations of the 
contemporary Australian legal system.30 
                                                
30 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 per Brennan J [29]. 
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If the court itself is declaring the paramountcy of values of justice and human rights and 
equality before the law, a lawyer, in terms of the common law and the Native Title Act, 
will arguably have a duty to advance the self determination of their client or at least give 
expression in their argument to justice and human rights.  This duty may well also extend 
to respondent lawyers who would need to present their own case in terms of the justice 
and human rights framework.  Instead native title cases are presented in terms of 
proprietary interests and conceptions of lists of traditional customs observed by outsiders 
which serve to erode the place of traditional owners within the dominant paradigm. 
I would argue that it is the duty of every lawyer to promote the self-determination of their 
client – regardless of the forum in which the lawyer is acting for that client but 
particularly so within an area identified with human rights, as is native title.  To act with 
integrity, the lawyer must ensure that their client is in an informed position from which to 
make decisions in their best interests, or which at least advance what the client perceives 
to be their best interests.  It is the duty of the lawyer to ascertain what those client 
perceptions are, and to identify how they can best be met by the law as it exists.  The 
lawyer is at the interface of the system of customary law of the traditional owner, and the 
common law.  To achieve the aims set out in the preamble of the NTA the lawyer must 
provide the means by which traditional owners’ custom and knowledge and feelings are 
presented as an independent system adhering to its own values.  If a lawyer presents the 
knowledge repackaged by the dominant system in terms foreign to the applicants 
interpreted by non-Indigenous lawyers and anthropologists, or presented in the way done 
by the defence in Kramer vs Kramer, this represents assimilation.  This repackaging 
denies the voice of the traditional owner in their terms, and implies to the court and 
therefore at law, that the traditional owners have accepted and internalised the values and 
culture of the dominant group. 
In the old school, a lawyer was the expert and the client simply did what they were told.  
This is no longer appropriate.  A lawyer must get informed instructions.  If the client is 
unaware of the stages in the legal process, their prospects of success and the 
consequences of failure, and how client information is used, then the client is 
marginalised by the process representing the dominant culture.   
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Stages in the Process 
Information about native title processes will empower traditional owners to the extent 
that they are more familiar with the processes imposed upon them, and therefore have the 
opportunity to become more engaged in these processes.  In my experience traditional 
owners are more keen than clients for whom I have acted in other fields, to engage 
actively with all aspects of the process.  I have for example taken for granted a directions 
hearing and its administrative nature, and failed to invite my clients to attend.  This 
represented my view of legal process as administrative, of little substance and of a 
routine nature.  My view failed to appreciate the empowering effect of active 
participation in legal processes on my clients.  In addition, if my clients followed my lead 
of accepting processes as simply part of the system without my deliberate raising of my 
own and my clients’ consciousness about the processes, the law and the tactics, they may 
run the risk of passively internalising this system thereby becoming part of it.   
I have seen how in the focus on land rights and the (common) law, people become goal 
oriented and ignore the steps taken to achieve that end.  This inevitably means that they 
are subsumed by the process.  This is where NTRB lawyers must be vigilant to maintain 
their clients’ voice: if they fail to give voice to what is important to their client at each 
step of the process, the dominant system becomes accepted as the new norm. 
In reality many traditional owners I have met continue to question the processes and 
system.  However their voices are not heard and there is no process in the courts for these 
voices genuinely to be heard.  Their lawyers work within the system, they are of the 
system, and they themselves often do not hear.  In failing to listen to these voices, and 
where lawyers fail to present this perspective in the context of native title processes, there 
will be an ongoing assumption by the participants in the system that the traditional 
owners do submit to the processes, and that they have internalised the values and culture 
of the dominant culture.  This is then detrimental to a party who is required to show that 
in fact they adhere to an alternative system of norms and traditions and culture.  This 
contributes to the destruction of native title, as recognised by the dominant system. 
Prospects of Success 
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The corollary to the NTA’s process of recognition and protection of native title is that if 
the court finds there are no native title rights and interests, the claimant group has no 
standing in the eyes of the common law as the people of that land – that is, in the eyes of 
the dominant group.  This is in stark contrast to how the traditional owners would 
perceive themselves, within their own norms.  (Norms which the common law has 
declared do not exist.)  This represents the dominant system purporting to assimilate the 
minority regardless of their self-perception – ie the destruction of native title. 
The lawyer, I would submit, has a vital role in declaring to their client the consequences 
for the group if the claim were not successful and the prospects for success of the claim.  
In theory, it is then a matter for the group to elect whether or not to proceed, and the basis 
on which it will proceed.  The process in which the group then elects to participate may 
well be one which alters the concept of traditional law by bringing it within the ambit of 
the common law.  However where choice is exercised, it represents more an adaptation 
by traditional owners rather than a usurping by the dominant paradigm.  Where lawyers 
fail to appraise their clients of the true prospects, they remove that choice and leave 
traditional owners to the system. 
 
Client Evidence 
As part of the process and prospects, claimants need particularly to be informed about 
connection, which requires the greatest amount and variety of evidence a lot of which 
may be sensitive if not confidential.  The duty must be to properly inform the client of the 
place of connection in the scheme of the native title claim and how the knowledge of the 
traditional owners, presented in the connection report, will or may be used in the 
proceedings.  The stakes here are very high and often traditional owners are not appraised 
of the downsides of providing information to support their claim.  These downsides are 
that the state (or another respondent) will test the evidence, and that the court may find 
that it does not support the claim, as occurred in Risk. This is the common law saying that 
a people has extinguished their own rights and interests in land so that the common law 
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will not recognise them.  The court is saying that there is no genuine ongoing traditional 
and customary connection with land with its source in pre-European times. 
If lawyers fail to put traditional owner clients in a position where the client appreciates 
how their knowledge is being used, lawyers run the risk not only of disempowering their 
client, but also of devaluing traditional culture and knowledge.  This is done passively, 
through use of what is not the lawyer’s, without express consent.  The lawyer will use the 
lens of their own experience and take for granted that the information of the client, the 
traditional owner, is evidence and use it accordingly.  This implies that the traditional 
owner has internalised the values and culture of the dominant system.  Again, this 
implication leaves the members of the dominant system believing that traditional owners 
are of the dominant system, where this may not be the case.  This perception undermines 
the culture and experience of the traditional owner, and indeed again, may ultimately 
change the nature of culture and knowledge where it intersects with the dominant culture. 
Informed Consent & Proper Instructions 
Providing appropriate information and proper disclosure of risks to traditional owner 
clients is not assimilation, rather it is the opposite.  Traditional owners are not asked to 
internalise these values and culture.  Rather it brings the common law to the client in 
terms that the client can understand, so as to allow the client to use that system on their 
own terms.  This is one responsibility of the lawyer.   
This is really only ensuring informed consent from clients.  If the client is properly 
informed then the lawyer not only obtains informed consent, but contributes to the self-
determination of the client.  A related issue to informed consent is taking proper 
instructions – and this is an area fraught with challenges for the native title lawyer. 
The courts take care to ensure that actions undertaken on behalf of claimant groups are 
authorised.  But authorised according to whose norms?  Many lawyers fail to question the 
basis on which they take instructions even in simple matters involving only two or three 
clients and they often make assumptions about how best to communicate with clients 
even in simple matters which are not complicated by language, culture, literacy, 
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remoteness, regularity of lifestyle or access to the tools of modern communication 
(including sometimes even the telephone). 
If native title lawyers set up processes based on genuine client instructions involving say 
a steering committee or a committee of elders, and other people join the group or turn up 
purporting to represent another member, the lawyer is often not in a position to evaluate 
whether this alteration accords with instructions.  While long-time lawyers with intimate 
knowledge of the group involved and its processes would be able to make an assessment, 
others will not. 
It is vital for lawyers to take proper instructions early on – again in the interests of 
empowerment of their traditional owner clients – to ensure proper reporting and 
communication processes.  Applying common law norms of authority may not work with 
a traditional owner group and this needs to be sorted out from the outset.  Failure to do so 
implicitly imposes on the group the dominant norms.  Yet again though, the lawyer faces 
the conflict between promoting clients’ self-determination and giving voice to traditional 
law and custom, and the imposition by the system of the dominant norms.  This can be 
illustrated by the Federal Court’s increasing reliance on timetables in native title claims 
and the proliferation of traditional owner incorporated bodies. 
The courts are becoming tougher imposing deadlines and timetables in native title cases 
and this impacts on authorisation meetings and meetings generally.  Groups are often 
dispersed over wide areas; members often live in remote areas sometimes isolated for 
months due to weather; and a death in a community may cause a lengthy delay in all land 
business.  Funding is always an issue.  Timetables will not always be able to cater for 
these contingencies, yet failure to cater for them puts to one side the claimants’ 
traditional way of doing business.  I am aware of an important authorisation meeting 
where key people were absent.  The cost of the meeting was well over $10,000 (plus time 
involved in putting it together).  The lawyer was nearly apoplectic at the absence – until 
they realised that it was due to the practice of avoidance rules.  The upside for the lawyer 
was that this provided evidence of a normative system of rules.  But the meeting 
ostensibly failed the dominant norm as to obtaining valid instructions. 
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Secondly, it is noted that traditional owner groups around the country have formed 
incorporated associations for any number of purposes – promoting arts language and 
culture, promoting land issues, receiving royalties, or to be a prescribed body corporate 
under the NTA.  Most NTRB’s are aboriginal corporations incorporated under the 
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth).  Incorporation is often required by 
law before benefits can be received.  Many corporations are set up within the common 
law but according to traditional decision-making structures.  However for any number of 
reasons, the formal decision-making structures may be set up otherwise.  That will not 
necessarily preclude traditional decision-making from taking place but so far as the 
common law is concerned, the documents of incorporation will be definitive.   
While the establishment of such a body may provide the lawyers with evidence of 
modern application of traditional decision-making, it also may not.  In Risk the court 
found that the entity making the decisions for the Larrakia people was Larrakia Nation 
Aboriginal Corporation.  ‘[I]ts composition [was] not traditional’ however as it was not 
universally accepted by all families, it was a democratic process and there was no 
evidence of involvement of a ‘superior elder reflecting the sort of status reported by the 
‘King’ figures referred to in earlier literature’.  The court did ‘not consider that process 
reflects the carrying on of the traditional method of decision-making by the Larrakia 
people’.31  While on the one hand often being required (by the dominant paradigm) to use 
modern decision-making structures, applicants on the other hand risk presenting to the 
court a departure from traditional law and custom.  In the case of the Larrakia, the burden 
of proving that their decision-making was undertaken in a traditional way was too great. 
This places a duty on the native title lawyer to think carefully about taking instructions 
and setting up traditional owner corporations.  The real seat of power may in fact be 
elsewhere.  To the extent that traditional owners use modern corporate structures, they 
run the risk of failing the native title test.  The dominant norms are simultaneously 
applied to traditional owners, yet where traditional owners conform to dominant norms, 
they are seen as assimilated to the dominant culture and their own culture is denied. 
                                                
31 Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 (unreported, Mansfield J, 13 April 2006) [832]. 
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I would suggest that it is the duty of the practitioner, in particular when acting for a client 
who is part of a disempowered group in society, to ascertain the client’s expectations and 
to inform the client as to the realistic prospects of success as well as the risks inherent in 
the process.  Callinan J acknowledged in Ward that: ‘[t]o these drawbacks flowing from 
the recognition of native title may be added others … I fear, the expectations of the 
indigenous people have been raised and dashed’.32 
The process of taking proper instructions and giving a client information to achieve 
informed consent will also give the lawyer information about the values and attitudes of 
the client.  These must be given voice to avoid the imputation of those in the dominant 
culture that traditional owners have submitted themselves to the system and that they 
have impliedly internalised its values.   
The Anthropologist 
Having explored the lawyer’s place in the native title scheme, we will briefly look at the 
anthropologist.  One of the challenges in native title law is finding the evidence 
considered acceptable to the court and the respondent parties, to support the claim.  The 
courts have to date relied on expert evidence and on reports written by early European 
witnesses to Indigenous culture. 
Interestingly, this evidence is that of non-indigenous people.  Logic would dictate that the 
experts on a traditional system of culture and law would be the people who practise that 
system and know it intimately yet traditional owners themselves are not necessarily 
called on to give expert evidence.  Their statements and activities however may be 
reported on by an anthropologist in support of the expert evidence given by that 
anthropologist.   
The position of the anthropologist is problematic.  As a discipline, anthropology 
traditionally looks at a traditional society through the lens of the dominant culture.  While 
the discipline has its own methodology (or methodologies) whose validity I do not 
challenge, it seeks to document a society through the observation and analysis of an 
                                                
32 Ward v Western Australia (2002) 191 ALR 1, [969]. 
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outsider.  Unlike the concept of traditional owners as the ‘other’ in dominant Australian 
culture and law, the anthropologist as the ‘other’ in a traditional system, is an empowered 
being.  They may leave at any time and are not at risk of internalising values and culture 
to the rejection of their own, so as to be assimilated into the traditional culture.   
Like the lawyer, the information, the knowledge and stories the anthropologist takes 
away inherently become something else, divorced from the people to whom they belong.  
In addition, the methodologies of the anthropologist are applied to the information, 
knowledge and stories to form the intellectual property of the anthropologist.  However 
scientific the methodology, this is the lens of the dominant culture and logically the 
understanding we receive of traditional culture is a product of the methodology, not of 
the culture itself. 
This is a filtering process which packages the traditional law and customs on which the 
court ultimately decides.  It is possible that this package will be what the common law 
accepts or rejects as the foundation of a people’s rights and interests.  The traditional 
culture is therefore subsumed by the common law, based on the anthropologist’s analysis. 
Apart from methodology, the fact of the outsider’s presence in the traditional context will 
inevitably skew the image received.  This is an issue dealt with inherently within the 
discipline, but it is problematic for the courts to receive this very particular perspective in 
the context of a native title claim, and it is problematic for the anthropologist to engage in 
this process, presenting a non-traditional version of a traditional system.  We return to 
Janice Gray’s comment: ‘the task of recognition is made easier if the unknown is equated 
with the known’.33  Perhaps this is the role of the anthropologist: as an intermediary 
between the dominant and the ‘other’. 
The danger here though is that through this process, declaring rights and interests based 
on the ‘expert’s’ report, the culture and knowledge and tradition of the traditional owner 
is assimilated into the dominant culture.  So far as the anthropologist works within this 
framework, the anthropologist will be complicit, with the lawyer and the legal system, in 
                                                
33 Janice Gray ‘Is Native Title a Proprietary Right?’ (2002) vol 9, No3 Murdoch University Electronic 
Journal of Law [7]. 
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rendering traditional knowledge and culture as deriving its validity of the dominant.  The 
real voice of the traditional owner is absent – present only through an agent’s 
interpretation. 
To the extent that the anthropologist works outside the framework, the evidence may lose 
its relevance.  In Risk the Northern Territory challenged the weight of the evidence of the 
historian engaged by the applicants’ NTRB on the basis ‘of her alleged ‘bias’ or 
predisposition in favour of the …applicants [and] …not all historians would approach the 
exercise using her methodology’.34   
The system is again placing the onus on applicants to deliver a package of evidence in 
terms and a form acceptable to the dominant norms.  Expert witnesses like 
anthropologists are caught in the system themselves where to engage will almost 
certainly contribute to the reduction of traditional law and custom to a commodity for the 
courtroom, far removed from its true place.  On the arguments I have put so far, this 
effectively dispossesses the traditional owners of their stories so that they become of the 
common law system.  This represents a covert assimilation of traditional culture in the 
eyes of the dominant. 
Conclusion 
In this reflection I have attempted to raise the consciousness of practitioners in the field.  
It is incumbent on each practitioner, regardless of expertise, to reflect on how they 
practise, how they are instruments of the dominant culture – and how this impacts on 
their clients, traditional owners.  A lack of awareness will draw them into the processes 
which in turn relentlessly pull traditional law and custom into the gravity field of the 
common law, and the dominant culture.   
Native title law is destroying native title on a number of fronts.  The NTA for all its talk 
of justice and advancement fails to articulate how this is achieved.  Instead it establishes a 
series of norms to measure whether it considers native title even exists. 
                                                
34 [120]. 
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The courts, in identifying native title as sui generis, have failed to give it substance and 
the NTA fails to allow processes by which traditional owners themselves are able to do 
so.  Where this process accepts native title exists, it becomes part of the common law and 
loses its unique nature.  The list of rights and interests, intelligible to the common law, is 
enumerated and that is what is protected.  Native title in its traditional sense is destroyed. 
Where the process rejects native title, traditional owners have nothing recognised by 
common law.  They are dispossessed forever of their rights.  Their native title is 
destroyed. 
This process of destruction is a form of assimilation aided and abetted by lawyers and 
anthropologists where in good faith they use the dominant paradigm to present their own 
version of traditional rights and interests.  To the extent that these practitioners fail to 
engage traditional owners in the process and to give true voice to the claimants, the 
traditional law, custom and knowledge is lost to the traditional owners and is again 
usurped by the system.  At every turn there is dismantling of what the common law sees 
as native title. 
Is all lost?  Practitioners in the field have a duty to raise the human rights element of 
native title, and to properly inform their clients.  Full and proper engagement in the 
system is the only way to restore some little power to claimants.  The Commonwealth as 
funder has a duty to give voice to traditional owners within the claim and funding 
processes.  Like respondent lawyers, they also have a duty to handle their claims in a way 
which reflects the underlying goals of the NTA. 
It will be with one voice, calling for recognition of human rights and true advancement of 
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders, that traditional native title rights and 
interest will be ascertained in a just and proper manner that has due regard for their 
unique character.  Without this voice, the NTA and native title law are mere puff and will 
guarantee the destruction of native title as it was decreed in Mabo. 
It was Callinan J in Ward v Western Australia, who sums up the state of native title law 
and its interpretation: 
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‘[i]t might have been better to redress the wrongs of dispossession by a true and unqualified 
settlement of lands or money than by an ultimately futile or unsatisfactory, in my respectful 
opinion, attempt to fold native title rights into the common law.’35 (emphasis added) 
 
                                                
35 (2002) 191 ALR 1, [970]. 
